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Richard Gombrich writes, he says, out of exaspera-
tion and admiration. He is exasperated because Bud-
dhists and non-Buddhists alike persistently fail to ade-
quately explain the Buddha’s ideas. This has meant both
that the Buddha’s contribution to human thought has not
been fully appreciated, and also that many are misin-
formed about what the Buddha taught; what can mea-
sure up, he asks, “to the idiocy of what educated people
are prepared not just to say but even to publish about
Buddhism? ” (pp. 200-201). On the other hand, Profes-
sor Gombrich believes that the Buddha’s ideas are in fact
neither very complex nor difficult to grasp. And while
Gombrich cannot agree with the Buddha on everything,
he is nonetheless an admirer, believing that much that
the Buddha thought and taught is of great value–indeed,
that the Buddha should be ranked among “the greatest
thinkers … of whom we have record in human history”
(pp. 1, 4). What is perhaps slightly surprising about this
book, given the rhetoric, is that the account it offers of
what the Buddha taught is, albeit with some significant
qualifications, not so different in substance from what
I, studying as an undergraduate in the late 1970s, was
brought up to believe the Buddha taught.
What Gombrich regards as misunderstandings are
sometimes of a general philosophical nature (that the
doctrine of “not self” involves a denial of personal con-
tinuity and moral responsibility, that dependent origina-
tion involves determinism); but for the most part they
seem to derive from attributing perspectives from the
later Buddhist tradition (the Abhidhamma, the Pali com-
mentaries, and the Mahāyāna sūtras) to the Buddha him-
self. Thus, for Gombrich, the “tedious” second half of the
Buddha’s First Sermon, wherewe are told “the doctrine of
the Four Noble Truths has twelve aspects … reeks of the
systematizers who produced the abhidhamma” (p. 103);
the “interpretation [of dependent origination] favoured
by Buddhaghosa, that the chain covers three lives of the
individual,” is “contorted” (p. 142); the Buddha’s later fol-
lowers took his insights into “no soul” in “a completely
literalist sense, so that they required a reductionist char-
acter” (p. 154); the Buddha’s “personal style in the Pali
Canon”–his way of adapting his message to his audience,
his use of analogies–is to be contrasted with the “author-
itarian [and] sometimes even strident” tone of the Lotus
Sūtra (p. 165).
Viewing the Abhidhamma literature and the
Mahāyāna sūtras as not having been taught by the Bud-
dha is, of course, nothing new, and Gombrich’s man-
ner of doing so sometimes betrays a failure to properly
consider the nature of later developments in Buddhist
thought. Gombrich is surely right to see the five-khandha
theory as representing something more like an analysis
of how the mind processes experiences than a list of the
constituents of an individual being–an analysis of how
things work, rather than of what exists. Yet the Pali Ab-
hidhamma literature can be read not so much as missing
this point (as Gombrich suggests at p. 154), but as pre-
cisely drawing it out. As A. K. Warder observed of the
Paṭṭhāna, the seventh work of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,
we have in it “a description not of what there is but of
what happens: this is entirely in accordance with the
Buddhist conception of the universe, that nothing ‘is’ …
but that there occur forces … which act as conditions for
one another.”[1]
Where Gombrich’s presentation of early Buddhist
thought is more truly distinctive is in two principal re-
spects. First is his emphasis on demonstrating that the
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genesis of Buddhist ideas is best understood as a response
to the pre-existing system of thought promulgated in
specifically brahmanical texts. Second, and closely linked
to the first, is the extent to which Gombrich wishes to
characterize those ideas as belonging to a specific histor-
ical personality: “One remarkable brain must have been
responsible for the basic ideology” (p. 17).
The brahmanical background to early Buddhist
thought is something that Gombrich has been exploring
in his writings for twenty years. The present book revis-
its and summarizes many of the arguments found in his
earlier publications. Gombrich’s account of the manner
in which the imagery of fire lurks behind some of the fa-
miliar concepts of early Buddhist thought and draws its
rhetorical force from the Vedic sacrifice is in many ways
compelling, and evokes a thought-world which we are in
danger of overlooking when we read the earliest sources
through the eyes of the later tradition. Yet his insistence
that the interpretative key to the Pali Nikāyas lies in see-
ing the Buddha as responding to brahmanical thought re-
mains contested. As Johannes Bronkhorst has recently
argued, other models for the evolution of Indian religious
ideas in the first millennium BCE are possible.[2]
From the perspective of later Theravāda tradition at
least, themost radical suggestion Gombrichmakes in this
context is that the Buddha taught kindness (mettā) as a
way to enlightenment, but that his immediate follow-
ers failed to understand this. The argument in essence
involves the claim–made to the Buddha’s brahmin au-
dience in the Tevijja-sutta–that “companionship with
Brahmā” (brahma-sahavyatā) after death is the highest
religious goal; thus when the Buddha then redefines
“companionship with Brahmā” as a meditative state that
involves pervading the six directions with a mind that
is full of kindness, he must intend to indicate his own
highest religious goal, namely enlightenment. On Gom-
brich’s view, however, the Buddha’s followers misunder-
stood what the Buddha was up to and so arrived at the
“dogma that someone who practised the brahma-vihāras
was reborn in the Brahmaworld but no higher” (p. 88). If,
as Gombrich claims, the teaching that “love and compas-
sion can be salvific for the person who cultivates those
feelings to the highest pitch” was such a crucial part of
what the Buddha taught (p. 195), it remains something of
a puzzle that he should have chosen to reveal this prin-
cipally to brahmin outsiders, and in terms that were ob-
scure to his own followers. Gombrich’s claim that the
subsequent compilers of the Abhidhamma define mettā
as “absence of hatred” (adosa) (p. 90) is misleading. As
Matilal pointed out with reference to the Buddhist un-
derstanding of “ignorance” (avidyā), the use of a term
formed with the privative prefix a- does not necessarily
entail mere absence;[3] in fact the Abhidhamma does not
define mettā as adosa, but rather adosa as mettā, making
precisely the point that adosa should be understood as a
positive quality and not simply the absence of a negative
one.
Gombrich’s emphasis on the brahmanical back-
ground to the Buddha’s ideas is closely linked to his
project of presenting the Buddha as a particular person-
ality. The confidence with which Gombrich draws his
portrait of the historical Buddha is a challenge to those
whom he views as unreasonably skeptical. Thus he is
keen to argue not just that the Pali Nikāyas should be re-
garded as the most important source for early Buddhist
thought, but also that they provide a reliable means of re-
covering the ideas of the Buddha himself. He regards the
Pali Nikāyas as having been composed and transmitted
orally as fixed texts in the manner of the Vedas. He does
not specify a precise date for their composition, but given
that he thinks the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta in its
present form “probably dates from as late as the Second
Council” and that the Saṃyutta Nikāya was closed at that
time (p. 104), it seems that he regards a significant por-
tion of the Pali Nikāyas as dating from the middle of the
fourth century BCE. (He places the death of the Buddha
in 405 BCE and the Second Council sixty years later [pp.
xiii, 101].)
The claim that the bulk of the suttas in the Pali
Nikāyas were transmitted verbatim as fixed texts from
the Second Council (or even earlier) is, in my view, hardly
credible. The Second Council evidently predates Bud-
dhist sectarianism; traditions of ancient Buddhism other
than the Pali also refer their collections of sūtras back to
this council. Some of the texts of these other traditions–
mostly, it seems, those of the Sarvāstivādins and the
Dharmaguptakas–survive, both in Indian languages and
in Chinese translation. While they are in many respects
remarkably close to the Pali texts, there are also differ-
ences. This indicates that Buddhist communities contin-
ued, after the Second Council, to compose and redact the
texts that make up the Nikāyas/Āgamas. To suggest that
this situation should apply only to some Buddhist schools
but not the Pali tradition–that it is, in effect, the other
schools that have diverged, while the Pali tradition pre-
serves the texts in precisely the form in which they were
recited at the Second Council–involves special pleading
that seems without basis. To begin with, the very lan-
guage of the Pali canon (displaying as it does features
of a western Prakrit) does not correspond with what we
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might expect for the language of a canon recited at Vaiśālī
in the east.
Gombrich, it seems to me, seriously underestimates
the significant extent to which the earliest sources are
at least one step removed from the Buddha. The Pali
Nikāyas and other comparable sources appear to be texts
composed by the first few generations of the Buddha’s
followers in order to communicate how they viewed the
Buddha and what they understood him to have taught.
That they did indeed understand correctly something of
what he taught seems a reasonable hypothesis. If they
did, we would expect them precisely to have expressed
that understanding not only by parroting the Buddha’s
ownwords, but also by reformulating and adding to them
in order to get the message across. And this is where
the difficulties lie. The very nature of the texts and their
complicated textual history mean that the task of identi-
fying sharp fault lines between what the Buddha taught
and what his early followers tell us he taught is far from
straightforward. The danger is that we begin to see the
fault lines where we want to see them.
Writing of the quest for the historical Jesus, E. P.
Sanders observed: “People want to agree with Jesus, and
this oftenmeans that they see him as agreeingwith them-
selves.”[4] It seems to me that much the same might be
said of the Buddha. While Gombrich expresses his admi-
ration for the Buddhist tradition, he emphasizes that the
“admirable part of the Buddhist tradition … goes back in
my view to the Buddha himself” (p. 1). Yet for all the
emphasis on the brahmanical context for the Buddha’s
ideas, Gombrich’s Buddha can seem a man at odds with
the culture of eastern India of the fifth century BCE. The
Buddha may have believed in some form of rebirth, but it
is doubtful, Gombrich tells us, that he really believed in
the existence of the divine beings of the Pali Nikāyas (pp.
73, 88). When the Buddha gave an account of the ori-
gins of human society involving realms and beings other
than human, he intended this simply as a satirical joke,
which his unimaginative followers failed to get and took
literally. Gombrich’s Buddha is concerned above all with
ethics and moral responsibility; as for meditation, “what
the Buddha was prescribing as mental training must ini-
tially have been what we nowadays take for granted in
an educated person, a basis for moral and intellectual un-
derstanding” (p. 172). The Buddha deprecated the use of
iddhi or “shamanic powers,” regarding them as having no
religious value (p. 72). “The Buddha declared ritual to be
useless or worse” (p. 200). In establishing the rules of
the Vinaya, the Buddha anticipated Karl Popper’s “epis-
temology of refutation and conjecture” (pp. 173, 177);
more generally the Buddha’s approach was not unlike
Popper’s approach to social philosophy (p. 178). On all
these issues, it would be possible to take the evidence of
the Nikāyas and paint a rather different portrait of the
Buddha from the one painted by Gombrich.
Modern scholarly studies of the figure of the Buddha
have tended in one of two directions. The first, going
back to Émile Senart and Hendrik Kern, has aimed to ar-
ticulate the reality of how the Buddha was understood
by his Indian followers, and so produces a vision of the
Buddha as a godlike “superman” (mahāpuruṣa). The sec-
ond, going back to Hermann Oldenberg and T. W. Rhys
Davids, has aimed at stripping away the myth and legend
seen as created by his followers, in order to reveal Go-
tama the man.[5] Gombrich’s What the Buddha Thought
clearly follows the latter route. In its extreme form, the
first of these approaches may end in denying that the
Buddha has any historical reality at all–a step that few
scholars seem inclined to take today.[6] The kind of ap-
proach exemplified by Gombrich, on the other hand, ends
in treating the truth the ancient authors wanted to com-
municate as a veil to be seen through.
Gombrich’s account of what Gotama the man
thought is executed with flair and conviction. The sketch
of early Buddhist ideas is lively and often perceptive. But
as the title of his final chapter puts it, is this book to be be-
lieved? As I have indicated, inmy view the answer has to
be: in some parts, yes, in others, no. Overall Gombrich’s
approach is much more speculative than he allows; no
doubt he would defend this by reference to his Popperian
method of conjecture and refutation (pp. 95–97).
Most scholars of Buddhism would probably accept
the reality of the historical Buddha in terms similar to
Étienne Lamotte’s: unless we accept that Buddhism has
its origins in the strong personality of its founder, it re-
mains inexplicable.[7]Yet a strong personality can take
various forms and be portrayed in various ways. Given
the nature of our sources in this case, recovering a his-
torical likeness may not be possible. What we are faced
with is a choice between the fantasy of Gotama the man,
or the reality of the Buddha as the texts portray him, ul-
timately untraceable (ananuvejja).[8]
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